Measuring cross-ownership and its effects in newspaper publishing industry by Björkroth, Tom & Grönlund, Mikko
TURUN YLIOPISTON BRAHEA-KESKUKSEN JULKAISUJA 2021, 2 
 
 
MEASURING CROSS-OWNERSHIP AND 
ITS EFFECTS IN NEWSPAPER 
PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 
 
Tom Björkroth & Mikko Grönlund 
Turun yliopiston Brahea-keskuksen julkaisuja 2021, 2 
Julkaisija  Turun yliopiston Brahea-keskus 
 www.utu.fi/braheakeskus 
Turku 2021 
ISBN 978-951-29-8508-1 (verkkojulkaisu) 
ISSN 2342-4273 (verkkojulkaisu) 
 
Measuring cross-ownership and its effects in newspaper publishing 
industry 
 





Cross-ownership has gained more attention since the Millennium. The effects of 
cross-ownership have been incorporated into standard game theoretical models, 
altering the traditional concentration measures and hence also the relationship 
between concentration and profitability. Empirical research on the effects of cross-
ownership on concentration and profitability is limited. This article compares the 
traditional concentration index with the one modified for cross-ownership in the 
Finnish newspaper publishing industry. With a dataset that covers all daily 
newspaper publishers between years 1950 and 2016, we show that cross-ownership 
is reflected in the modified empirical concentration measures. We also show how 
acknowledging the two-sidedness of a market affects the profitability measures 
originally developed for traditional markets. 
 







Kiinnostus ristiinomistusta ja sen vaikutuksia kohtaan on lisääntynyt vuosituhannen 
vaihteen jälkeen. Sisällytettäessä ristiinomistuksen vaikutukset yleisesti käytettyihin 
peliteoreettisiin malleihin, muuttavat ne sekä perinteisiä keskittymismittareita että 
keskittymisen ja kannattavuuden suhdetta. Ristiinomistuksen vaikutuksista 
keskittymiseen ja kannattavuuteen tehdyn empiirisen tutkimuksen määrä on 
kuitenkin rajallinen. Tässä artikkelissa tarkastellaan suomalaisen sanomalehtikentän 
keskittymistä sekä perinteisellä että ristiinomistuksen huomioivalla muokatulla 
keskittymisindeksillä. Aineistolla, joka koostuu kattavasti suomalaisista 
sanomalehdistä vuosien 1950 ja 2016 väliseltä ajanjaksolta, osoitamme muutamilla 
esimerkeillä, kuinka yritysten välinen ristiinomistus heijastuu muokattuihin 
keskittymismittareihin. Osoitamme myös, kuinka markkinoiden kaksipuolisuuden 
huomioiminen vaikuttaa alun perin perinteisille yksipuolisille markkinoille 
kehitettyihin kannattavuusmittareihin. 
AVAINSANAT: Sanomalehdet, ristiinomistus, markkinoiden keskittyminen, 
kannattavuus, kaksipuoliset markkinat 
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Digitalization of content challenges traditional media products such as 
newspapers and contributes to market exit and consolidation in several 
countries, including Finland. Competition policy in media markets is not only 
concerned with this trend because of reduced economic competition, but also 
because of potentially reduced pluralism (Stühmeier, 2016). Media market 
structures change continuously and the observation of increasing market 
concentration in newspaper publishing is not a new one. For example, Picard 
(1988) examined the concentration in the U.S. newspaper industry using daily 
papers in local markets and Dertouzos and Trautman (1990) studied economic 
effects of media concentration in the U.S. newspaper industry, while Artero 
& Sánchez-Tabernero (2015) provide more recent results on increasing 
newspaper market concentration in Spain.  
 The study of market concentration and its effects on market 
competition dates to Mason (1939) and Bain (1951), who identified the 
positive relationship between market concentration and profitability. 
Subsequently a vast number of studies have been conducted on the topic, (for 
a survey c.f. Gilbert, 1984). The early studies did not consider the issue of 
cross-ownership. Some later studies (e.g. Ferguson, 1983) have focused on 
its effects, but with cross-ownership referring to same owners controlling 
different media. In what follows, cross-ownership refers to horizontal cross-
ownership within the same media, i.e. between firms in the newspaper 
publishing industry. 
Depending on its extent and nature, cross-ownership can affect firms’ 
profit maximization; in that, it considers the effects of its own actions on the 
partly owned rivals’ or on its main owners’ profitability.  Consequently, 
mutual cross-ownership alters the nature of interdependence between 
oligopolistic firms more than simple, one-way horizontal cross-holdings. 
Reynolds and Snapp (1986) pioneered in incorporating the effect of cross-
ownership into Cournot models. They make a distinction between a firm's 
operating and aggregated profit, the latter of which includes firms own profits 
and the profits from its stakes in the rivals.  Bresnahan & Salop (1986) 
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extended this approach by maintaining the focus on direct interests, but 
introduced a distinction between financial and corporate control interests. Our 
paper adheres to this direction of development. We note that Flath (1992) 
represents an alternative direction, by maintaining the focus of Reynolds and 
Snapp (1986) on financial interests, but adds the distinction between direct 
and indirect interests.   Maxwell, Salop & Parsons (1999) complements the 
theory by focusing on effects of common ownership, i.e. external investors 
holding stakes in a number of rivals. Salop & O’Brien (2000) extended the 
Cournot model to consider partial ownership interests under different 
assumptions regarding financial interests and corporate control. These 
extensions maintain the traditional relation between market power and 
concentration. This article does not consider these alternative directions, 
leaving them as potential future avenues of research.  
With horizontal cross-ownership, the market concentration is measured 
by a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman index (MHHI), which adds a factor to 
the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to account for the degree 
of cross-ownership and the extent of control that such ownership allows the 
firms to exert on each other.   
Because cross-ownership is likely to influence firms’ incentives to 
compete, the MHHI serves as a rough gauge of these partial ownerships’ 
effects on competition.   
Empirical studies show mixed results on whether cross-ownership or 
related concentration measures matter for pricing or output (c.f. Newmark, 
2004). However, recent contributions point to that, the issue of increased firm 
interdependency warrants attention. In studying the effect of common 
ownership in the airline industry on pricing, Azar, Schmalz and Tecu (2018) 
find  based on a  fixed-effect  panel  regressions that  ticket  prices  are  
approximately  3-7% higher on the average US airline route than would be 
the case under separate ownership. They conclude that there are indications 
of a causal link between common ownership and higher product prices.  
According to Elhauge (2016), horizontal shareholdings can also help to 
explain other economic phenomena such as the use of “seemingly perverse” 
schemes of executive compensation that corporations fail to expand output 
and employment despite high profits, and the rise in economic inequality. He 
argues that such harmful economic consequences can and should be mitigated 
by enforcement of antitrust law to challenge stock acquisitions resulting in 
anticompetitive horizontal shareholdings. 
Apart from the contribution of Azar et al (2018), empirical studies are still 
quite limited. Campos and Vega (2002) studied to what extent common 
ownership amplifies the traditional concentrations measures in the Spanish 
Introduction 
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electricity generating industry. Azar (2012) estimates the effects of common 
ownership of U.S. stocks over time with cross industry panel regressions. He 
finds a positive relationship between the degree of cross-ownership and profit 
margins, concluding that the full ownership structure of the firms, including 
institutional shareholders with passive portfolio strategies, should be used 
when calculating the modified indices of market concentration. 
In the empirical literature we have reviewed, the effects of horizontal 
cross-ownership have not been analysed in the newspaper publishing 
industry. This article will do that by investigating to what extent the cross-
ownership affects the traditional concentration indices in the Finnish market 
for newspaper publishing. The analysis is extended to consider the recent 
advances in theory of two-sided markets by Correia-da-Silva, Jullien, Lefouili 
& Pinho (2018), which establishes a connection between market 
concentration and profitability in the context of platforms. This complements 
our earlier studies on regional and national market concentration in 
newspaper publishing.  
The structure of the article is as follows. Chapter 2 restates the basic model 
and recent modifications of how cross-ownership alters a quantity 
competition framework and how the modified concentration index is derived 
and related to average industry profitability. Chapter 3 describes the data used 
in this paper together with an outlook of development of market concentration 
in Finnish newspaper publishing. It also reports the effects of cross-ownership 
on concentration levels. Chapter 4 analyses the implications of cross-
ownership and increased concentration on the profitability of the industry. We 
calculate the weighing matrix and analyse to what extent the cross-ownership 
has caused the HHI and the MHHI to diverge. 
 Chapter 5 concludes and discusses future avenues of research.   
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2 Method - Cross-ownership and 
concentration 
2.1 Theory behind measures derived 
 
Our approach builds on the familiar relation between HHI and intensity of 
competition when firms are Cournot competitors, i.e. compete in homogenous 
products with quantities or capacity as strategic variables.1 Let the cross-
ownership be reflected in βij that denotes the degree to which firm i holds a 
stake in firm j,  or the weight that manager of firm j places on owner i's 
profits.2 The shareholding may (but does not have to) reflect the degree of 
control that owner i has over firm j, the ij. The degree of ownership and the 
degree of control can coincide, which means that βij = ij. The manager of 
firm j maximizes the profit (Πj) taking into account the cross-ownership, 
maximizing the weighted profit3 of its i (i=1,…N) owners and a total of k 








The first order condition is: 
 
 
1 The model is based on O’Brien & Salop (2000, 608-614). The assumption of homogeneous 
goods is a simplification, since newspapers can be thought of as differentiated products.  
2 There is a total of i firms whose interests are considered by the manager.  
3 Profit is defined, as usual, as a difference between revenues P(Q)qk and costs Ck(qk). 
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As Campos and Vega (2002) note, when comparing this first order 
condition to the standard first order condition of a Cournot model, it is 
obvious that cross-ownership alters the effective market concentration and 
alters the market equilibrium in terms of output. Consequently, cross-
ownership also alters the traditional relationship with the concentration 
measure HHI and the relative price-cost margin (the Lerner index). 
By multiplying the first order condition through with Q/Q and with 1/p 













, where denotes the absolute value of elasticity of demand. Multiplying this 













Since the summation term is the modified Herfindahl-Hirschman index 







To elaborate how cross-ownership modifies the traditional relationship L= 
(HHI/), we can express the MHHI as: 











, where we can denote the summation term as MHHI. 
With cross-ownership, the summation term exceeds zero, which means 
MHHI>HHI. Consequently, using the MHHI instead of HHI in calculating 
the Lerner index means that the weighted industry price cost margin (or 
degree of market power) is larger in equilibrium with cross-ownership and 
when the degree of control in and by horizontal rivals increases. 
Since the standard HHI is straightforward to calculate, we need to 
calculate the summation term in order to derive the MHHI. The MHHI has 
been simplified to a matrix notation: 
 
= ′  
 
, where s’ is a transpose of the vector of firms market shares s, while  
denotes the weighting matrix, containing not only the degrees of cross-
ownership, but the weight firm j places on its rival owners’ profits in relation 
to its own. s denotes the vector of market shares.  The weighted matrix is 











An alternative to the derivation above is to follow the approach by 
Gramlich & Grundl (2017) and divide the manager’s maximization problem 







which is equal to  
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= +  
 
 
The weight includes the weight that firm j places on the profits of the 
rival k, relative to the weight wjj it places on its own profits. These profit 
weights are collected in a matrix   that can be used to calculate the MHHI. 
The NxN weight matrix is multiplied with the column and row vectors of N 
firms’ market shares, i.e.: 
 
= ′  
 
The degree of cross-ownership between a pair of firms can be 
approximated by the number of dividend-earning shares held in and by a rival 
firm. The degree of control depends on the specific voting rights conferred to 
those shares. With proportional control right ij = βij, which means that absent 
any other cross-ownerships a rival i’s stake of 20 percent yields it a 20 percent 
control, and has a weight of about 0.0625 in firm j:s profit maximization. This 
is probably a simplification of the reality, but it serves as a benchmark against 
which to discuss the effect on results of alternative modes of control.   
Minority shareholdings can result in common board members between 
actual and potential competitors, i.e. horizontal interlocking directorates 
(Petersen, 2016). Interlocking directorates can influence, just as cross-
ownership per se, competition negatively in two ways. First, they can 
reinforce the reduction from the minority shareholding on incentives to 
compete (unilateral effects).  Secondly, they may facilitate collusion between 
the firms (coordinated effects) due to the increased transparency (Gabrielsen, 
Hjelmeng & Sørgard, 2011; Petersen, 2016; OECD, 2008).  
We know that the cross-ownership between Finnish newspaper publishers 
has resulted in interlocking directorates, but with limited affects at the 
regional level.   However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse 
whether this plays a role for incentives for coordination in terms of 
geographical market segmentation, for example. 
After a brief industry description, we will analyse the development of 




3 Market concentration and cross-
ownership in Finnish newspaper 
publishing industry 
3.1 Description of the current newspaper markets 
According to Lehtisaari and Grönlund (2015), Finland has been an 
exceptional market for newspapers because subscriptions have such a solid 
foothold. In addition, an encompassing and effective home delivery system 
has enabled newspapers to function as an efficient marketing channel. 
Therefore, newspapers retained their position as the largest advertising 
medium until recently. During the recent years, the Finnish newspaper 
publishing industry has experienced substantial changes both in the business 
environment and in terms of technological development. Fast spread of ICT, 
and according to Lehtisaari & al. (2012) the rise of the Internet, the 
digitalisation of information and the dissipation of boundaries between media 
platforms, convergence changes the socioeconomic field in which newspaper 
publishers operate. Ala-Fossi & al. (2020) have stated that in Finland digital 
distribution platforms have gained popularity while traditional distribution 
channels have lost ground. This change in consumer media usage has 
influenced and reallocated advertisers' investments and, consequently, the 
media business environment. Concurrently, the Internet and the emergence of 
free-of-charge online news have affected people’s willingness to pay for 
journalistic contents (Grönlund & Björkroth, 2011). According to the Reuters 
Institute Digital News Report (2019) even though the proportion of people 
who pay for online news is somewhat higher than average internationally, less 
than 20% of Finns pay for online news. 
Finnish newspaper publishing markets are divided to several regional 
markets4 that are characterized by relatively large enterprises publishing one 
 
 
4 Finland is divided into 19 regions, called maakunta in Finnish. The regions are governed 
by regional councils, which serve as forums of cooperation for the municipalities of a region. 
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or several newspapers with predominantly regional circulation. Only a few 
newspaper titles, including tabloids, which can be classified as national. A 
primary indicator of industry change involves the number of entities active in 
the field, because it reveals whether the industry is expanding or decreasing. 
The total number of newspapers reached its height in 1990, but the economic 
depression of the early 1990s led to closures and mergers of many 
economically non-viable newspapers, primarily non-daily newspapers.  
 
 
Figure 1. Total number of paid-for newspaper titles 1950-2016 (Source: modified from 
Björkroth & Grönlund, 2015) 
 
According to Björkroth & Grönlund (2015), between 1950 and 2010, the 
Finnish newspaper industry faced a total of 240 newspaper entries and 197 
exits. After 2010, there has been approximately twenty newspaper exits and 
by the year 2016, the total number of paid-for newspaper titles had declined 
 
 
The main tasks of the regions are regional planning and development of enterprise and 
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to approximately two hundred5. Total print circulation of newspapers has 
declined for almost three decades and it was estimated6 to have fallen well 
below 2.5 million around mid of 2010’s.  The continued decline is a serious 
problem for the newspapers because most of their revenue, excluding some 
exceptions, still comes from print. However, Finnish newspaper publishers 
have smoothed their print-readers’ way into digital by offering bundled 
subscriptions at a similar price – or slightly higher – as print-only 
subscriptions. The government’s decision7 to decrease VAT for digital media 
from 24% to 10% (the same as for subscribed print media) entered into force 
on 1 July 2019. This tax reduction will probably accelerate the change from 
print to digital and make investing in online services more attractive for 
publishers. 
In competition for the readers and advertisers, the pressure on 
newspapers has been shown to stem from intra- (between newspapers) and 
inter-media (newspapers vs. other media) competition (Grönlund & 
Björkroth, 2011). To succeed, major Finnish newspaper publishing 
companies have responded to the challenges posted by the changing business 
environment by expanding into other media or new business areas. 
Concurrently, the concentration and chaining of newspaper titles and 
companies has continued, and significant acquisitions have continued in the 
2010s. This has increased market concentration and market position of the 
major newspaper companies compared to their competitors, especially in the 
regional markets, has strengthened. In addition, newspaper companies have 
increased editorial and marketing co-operation, both within and between 
different newspaper chains. Therefore, the current Finnish media landscape 
is to an increasing degree both vertically and horizontally clustered and 
integrated, shaping the landscape of Finnish news media into an even more 
complex network. For example, towards the end of 2019, Keskisuomalainen 
Oyj owned over a quarter (28%) of all member titles8 of the Finnish 
Newspapers Association. The five largest groups measured with number of 
 
 
5 A quarter of all paid-for newspaper titles are dailies (4-7 times a week) and the remaining 
three quarters are non-dailies (1 to 3 times a week).  
6 Total circulation data is based on verified audits by Media Audit Finland. However, a 
growing number of newspapers have been excluded from circulation auditing. Therefore, it 
has become increasingly difficult to calculate or estimate total circulation of newspapers.  
7 HE 303/2018 vp 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/HallituksenEsitys/Documents/HE_303+2018.pdf 
 
8 The association’s members publish 170 newspapers, 59 free newspapers, two web 
publications and four other newspapers. 
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titles9 accounted for half (51%) of all member titles. The aggregated share of 
the ten largest newspaper-publishing groups in terms of titles is already two-
thirds (67%). 
 
3.2 Concentration of the newspaper markets 
If we calculate the HHI-index, scaled from zero to 10,000, for the entire 
Finland we get for ownership HHIO=955.9 and for newspaper circulation 
HHIN= 321.9, indicating a low degree of concentration. However, the average 
concentration and the market share mobility of ownership at the regional level 
has been increasing since the 1950s, while this is less clear for the level of 
circulation.  (Björkroth & Grönlund, 2015) 
  
 
Figure 1. Development of average regional concentration level of ownership and circulation in 




9 Keskisuomalainen Oyj, Alma Media Oyj, Suomalainen Lehtipaino Oy, Kaleva Oy ja KPK 
Yhtiöt Oyj (until 2019 Keski-Pohjanmaan Kirjapaino Oyj). 
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Data on circulation of individual newspapers indicates that a nationwide 
market is too broad a definition of relevant markets, as the circulation of 
newspapers being predominantly regional.10 Hence, it makes more sense to 
analyse how the average regional concentration has developed over time. In 
Figure 2, we have illustrated the arithmetic mean of regional concentration in 
terms of HHIO and HHIN in Finland from 1950 to 2016. 
The figure confirms that at a regional level, the ownership is quite 
concentrated. Previous research shows that the dynamics in these markets 
stems mainly from exits of newspapers due to mergers or ceased operations. 
(c.f. Björkroth & Grönlund, 2015). 
From Figure 3 it is evident that the average degree of ownership 
concentration, measured with HHI-index, has increased since 1970. By 
weighing the regional concentration indices with each region’s share of total 
circulation, we got a weighted average degree of concentration for the period. 
This too showed a continuous increase since the 1970s, although from 2000 
onwards the pace of the increase is lower than in the unweighted series. This 
suggests that ownership concentration is increasing faster in regions with 




10 According to Björkroth & Grönlund (2015), the audited circulation figures showed for year 
that on average 92% (median 95%) of the circulation of the regional 7 days a week 
newspapers comes from their home province. There were only three newspapers with less 
than 85% of their circulation coming from their home province. For four of five 7-day 
newspapers, the share of home province circulation exceeds 90%. 
 





Figure 3. Average regional HHI of ownership in newspaper publishing 1950-2016 
The average figures effectively conceal the differences between regions 
as to what extent the measures HHIO and HHIN correlate over time. In most 
of the regions, we found a positive correlation between the newspaper-level 
and ownership-level concentrations (Figure 4). In terms of equivalents11, this 





11 Theoretical number of firms when the maximal HHI is divided by the actual size of the 
HHI. This yields the (theoretical) number of firms with equal market shares. 



























Figure 4. Distribution of regions according to the correlation between HHI-O and HHI-N 
The negative correlation, i.e. growing ownership concentration is 
combined with a decreasing concentration on newspaper level, can be 
explained by the leading regional newspaper having lost market shares in 
circulation to other, or relatively more, newspapers in the industry, although 
they might be owned by the same firm. 
 
3.3 Type and degree of cross-ownership 
 
 
From the data on direct horizontal shareholdings in the Finnish newspaper 
industry, we identified some substantial degrees of cross-ownership between 
the major newspaper publishing companies. In some cases, the degree of 
cross-ownership implies that our assumption of the cross-ownership 
reflecting only a passive interest in rivals’ profits may be a simplification. We 
also observed interlocking directorates between the firms, i.e. the stakes in 
rivals have resulted in rivals having common board members as well. 
Additional features that could affect the effective concentration are the 
existence of joint ventures, the indirect ownership of several rivals and that 
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We will, for the sake of simplicity and in order to construct a benchmark 
for the cross-ownership and the degree of effective concentration, analyse the 
effect of cross-ownership in isolation. This should yield a minimum effect of 
cross-ownership. The features mentioned above enhance the effective 
concentration levels, but this will be addressed in the discussion of the results. 
Table 1 below summarizes the direct horizontal cross-ownership between 
the 82 newspaper publishers in 2016. It reveals that the degree of cross-
ownership exceed 20 per cent in two occasions: Ilkka-Yhtymä Oyj12 holds a 
27.3 per cent stake in Alma Media Oyj and KSF Media Ab owns 21 per cent 
of Nya Ålands Tidningsaktiebolag. Other stakes that exceed the 10 per cent 
level are Ilkka-Yhtymä Oyj’s stake of 15.4 per cent in Keski-Pohjanmaan 
Kirjapaino Oyj and Keskisuomalainen Oyj’s share of 11.3 per cent in 





12 Oyj is Finnish acronym for publicly listed company (Plc). Oy is Finnish language acronym 
for limited company (Ltd). Ab is Swedish language acronym for limited company (Ltd).  
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Table 1.  Percentage of shares held by and in rival undertakings in 2016 
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Uusimaa 2*    5 1* + 4   2* 1* 
Southwest 
Finland 
1 2         
Satakunta 5          
Kanta-Häme 1    2      
Pirkanmaa 5          
Päijät-Häme           
Kymenlaakso           
South Karelia        1   
South Savo     3      
North Savo     11      
North Karelia        6   
Central Finland 2    7      
South 
Ostrobothnia 
  5        
Ostrobothnia    1       
Central 
Ostrobothnia 
   3       
North 
Ostobothnia 
2  2 4       
Kainuu           
Lapland 2          
Åland       1    
* National newspaper title. Dark grey colour of the box indicates the location of headquarters of the 
company. 
 
The total stake held by rivals exceeded one-fifth in the case of Alma Media 
Oyj (28.3%), Keski-Pohjanmaan Kirjapaino Oyj (23 %) and Nya Ålands 
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Tidningsaktiebolag (21 %).  No (significant) cross-ownership is reported for 
72 newspaper-publishing companies, of which some held significant national 
and regional market shares.   
The calculation of the weighing matrix  is rather straightforward as 
there is a mutual cross-ownership only in the case of Ilkka-Yhtymä Oyj and 
Keski-Pohjanmaan Kirjapaino Oyj. Assuming proportional control, the 
weighing matrix for MHHI will be as follows. 
 
 
In order to calculate the MHHI we will multiply the 82x82 weighing 
matrix with the vector and transpose of market shares for each publisher.13 
This yields a MHHI of 965.7, leaving the MHHI at 9.81 or to 1 percent of 
the HHI. This is in line with the results in Campos & Vega (2002), who also 
report quite a small difference between HHI and the GHHI, although our 





13 This weighing matrix can be used for the calculation of regional MHHIs, since if firm i or 
j, or either, is not present in a region, the market share will be zero and the weight for a 
particular cross-ownership will affect the MHHI of that region. 




Figure 5. Finland's 19 regions 
In the Table 3 below, we have summarized the results for entire Finland 
together with the regions of Uusimaa and Ostrobothnia, where the effect of 
cross-ownership is potentially largest due to cross-ownership. 
In Uusimaa and Ostrobothnia, the MHHI was 0.07 and 3.40 respectively, 
which is modest, being less than 0.01 percent of HHI. 
Table 3 includes an analysis where we have artificially merged the regions 
Ostrobothnia and Central Ostrobothnia, to form one hypothetical 
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geographical market with about a quarter of Million inhabitants.14 The result 
was that the cross-ownership yielded a MHHI of 27.7 points, which is 0.92 
percent of the HHI, which is a rather modest increase.  We will see below that 
assuming a one-sided market and Cournot competition, the relative 
percentage change in effective concentration coincides with the relative 
percentage change in profitability. 
Table 3.  HHI, MHHI and MHHI in year 2016 for selected geographical regions 
 
REGION OR AREA CIRCULATION / 
INHABITANTS 
(000’S) 
HHI MHHI MHHI 
FINLAND 2.389/5.503 955.9 965.7 9.81 
UUSIMAA 880.0/1.638 2942.37 2942.45 0.07 








14 Merging these geographical areas are surely hypothetical and does not here consider that 
firm strategies and market structure may be endogenous to the size of the geographical 
market. It only serves as an example to illustrate the effect of mutual cross-ownership.  
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4 Effect of cross-ownership on 
profitability and the potential fallacy 
in omitting two-sidedness 
4.1 Assessment with measures developed for one-
sided markets 
 
For a traditional single-sided business, profit maximization occurs when it 
produces at a level output at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
This yields the familiar equilibrium result for oligopoly stating that the 
relative price marginal-cost margin equals the ratio of market concentration 
(HHI) to the absolute value of the own-price elasticity of demand.  
Our results indicate that under assumption of proportional control, the 
cross-ownership between newspaper publishers do not seem to raise any 
concerns regarding its possibilities to strengthen the market power of the 
firms. The regional markets are quite concentrated already and the cross-
ownership is less apparent between firms active in the same region.  
What this degree of concentration means for weighed industry 
profitability depends on the price elasticity of demand. Nikali (2014) reported 
a price elasticity of demand () at national level of -.58 for printed 
newspapers, while Luostarinen (2015) indicated a demand elasticity of -.37. 
15 
If we assume that =-.58 the national level HHI of 955.9 and MHHI of 
965.7 would suggest that the effect of cross-ownership is to increase the 
weighted relative price cost margin from 0.165 to 0.1665, i.e. with 0.9%.  For 
the regions of Uusimaa and Ostrobothnia, the cross-ownership does not 
materially alter the industry Lerner index of 0.507 and 0.69, respectively.  
 
 
15 Nikali (2014) used a macroeconomic model with times series from 1990-2013, while 
Luostarinen (2015) used data from years 2006-2013 to estimate the effect of the introduction 
of VAT on newspaper demand and obtained the relation between the changed quantity and 
price change from this. 
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Assuming  inelastic demand =-0.58 and accounting for (proportional 
control) cross-ownership in the combined region of Ostrobothnia and Central 
Ostrobothnia implies an increase of the industry Lerner index from 0,517 to 
0.522, i.e. also with 0.9 per cent. Assuming =-.38 does not materially alter 
the effect, since an increase of the industry Lerner index in this hypothetically 
combined region would then be from 0.789 to 0.796, i.e. with 0.9 per cent.  
How about the advertising side?  We calculated the HHI, MHHI and MHHI 
for newspaper advertising revenues for the combined region of Ostrobothnia 
and Central Ostrobothnia. In the calculation of MHHI, we used the same 
weighing matrix as for the circulation side of the market. The obtained values 
were HHI=3379.3, MHHI=3404, which yields MHHI=24.7.  Consequently, 
the concentration indexes are significantly higher on the advertising side of 
the market. This is in line with earlier results of the Finnish market (Björkroth 
& Grönlund, 2011, 47), but differs from observations by Filistrucchi et 
al.(2012) in that in the Dutch newspaper market the HHI on advertising side 
was 15 to 23% lower than on the circulation side. 
Table 4 reports the values of the concentration index, and what accounting 
for cross-ownership would imply for the relative price cost margin L and 
changes therein (L, in percent) with arbitrarily chosen absolute values of 
demand elasticities of 0.5, 0.1 and 1.5 and 2.0 if the market for advertising is 
treated as a one-sided market.  
Table 4.  Concentration indexes and price-cost margins for newspaper advertising in the 
combined region of Ostrobothnia and Central Ostrobothnia in 2016. 
 
 | .  | .  | .  | .  
HHI=3379.3 0.676 0.338 0.225 0.169 
MHHI=3404 0.681 0.340 0.227 0.170 
L (%) 0.73 % 0.73 % 0.73 % 0.73 % 
 
Table 4 shows that, assuming a one-sided market with strategies in quantities; 
price cost margin is largely determined by the level of price elasticity of 
advertising demand. Moreover, the relative increase in concentration affects 
profits in absolute terms more the higher the market concentration.   
However, these baseline results could be simplifications, if they omit 
existing features of a two-sided market, where the demands on both sides are 
interconnected through the externalities they impose on each other. 
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Therefore, they can be used as rough gauges, but a more exact analysis can 
make use of recent developments in economic theory of two-sided markets.  
 
4.2 Correcting for the two-sidedness of the 
newspaper market 
 
According to Evans (2008, 675) there are three issues complicating an 
analysis for two-sided markets. First, the optimal prices depend in a complex 
way on the demand elasticity on both sides, the nature and intensity of the 
indirect network effects between the two sides, and the marginal costs that 
result from changing output of each side. Secondly, the profit-maximizing, 
non-predatory price for either side may be below the marginal cost of supply 
for that side or even negative. Thirdly, the relationship between price and cost 
is complex, and the simple formulas that have been derived for single-sided 
markets do not apply. 
 Next, we apply the results of Correia‐da‐Silva, et al. (2018) showing that 
for the ratio of HHI to the elasticity of demand to be a good measure of the 
aggregate Lerner index on a given side, it needs to be adjusted downward 
with respect to its standard definition for a one-sided market. This adjustment 
should be greater the larger the network effects and the larger the correlation 
between market shares on the two sides of the market.  We take their result to 
hold for the modified HHI (MHHI) as well. 
 The Lerner index for a side i (subscriptions or advertising) of newspaper 
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where ̂  is the externality adjusted price of side i.16.   For a single newspaper, 
the first order condition for its profit-maximizing problem with respect to 


























In the expression above, we follow Correia‐da‐Silva et al. (2018) and denote the 





 =  
It seems  >0 and that  
 
> 0, > 0, > 0,

> 0, > 0 
 
 




16 In a Cournot equilibrium where all newspapers are active on both sides, the externality-
adjusted price on a given side are defined as ̂ = − , where αj is denotes the increase 
in utility of a consumer on side i when there is increased participation on side j. αj is assumed 
to be positive. On an aggregate industry level, the Lerner index is defined as: = ∑ , 
where  denotes newspaper k’s market share on side i of the market.i denotes the demand 
elasticity on side i. In this context i,j=1,2, but i≠j. 
17 See Correia‐da‐Silva et al. (2018) for details. 
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● the utility of one side when the participation of the other side 
increases ( , ) 
● the correlation between the market shares on both sides of the 
market (S) 
● the elasticity of demand, and 
● the participation on the other side of the market. 
With all other things equal, the adjustment term decreases with the increase 
of the externality-adjusted price ̂ . This externality adjusted price increases 
(ceteris paribus) with an increase of price level on that side, whereas 
increases in utility and degree of participation on the other side decrease ̂  
and contributes to an increase in .18 
If we assume that the increase in cross-ownership affects only the 
concentration ratio HHI and not the variables in the correction term, we may 
replace the HHI with MHHI and denote the Lerner indexes Li(HHI) and 
Li(MHHI) respectively19.  As all the variables in the correction term are 
strictly positive, the price-cost margin for a side i in a two-sided market will 
be lower than in the case of a one-sided market. However, as we are interested 
in the effect of cross-ownership on profitability and the estimation of the 
variables in the correction term is beyond the scope of this paper, we may still 
assess the relative change in the Lerner index while keeping the correction 
term constant. 
Since the correction term is positive, the traditional measure of HHI or 
MHHI in relation to elasticity denotes the maximal profits. 
 If we denote the correction term with , and assume it will not change in 
response to increase in cross-ownership, the relative increase in the price cost 




18 See definition of the externality-adjusted price in footnote 14. 
19 As S is defined as a sum of products of the market shares on both sides of the market, it is 
possible that cross-ownership can affect the “correlation” between the market shares at 
ownership level.  This means that the numerator decreases and the denominator increases, 
which means (ceteris paribus) that the change in Lerner index will get smaller for a given 
increase in ΔMHHI.   


















This equation echoes the finding of Correia‐da‐Silva et al (2008) in that the 
role of elasticity of demand seems to diminish. It is, however still present in 
the correction term . 
With >0, the increase in relative profitability from cross-ownership in 
both circulation and advertising sides is larger when we consider the two-
sidedness. With = 0  the results would coincide with those of a one-sided 
market, but without exact knowledge about the correction term, we can only 
state that the effect of cross-ownership on the margin on the circulation side 
is at least of the magnitude calculated for the one-sided market. It is clear 
from the equation above that  > 0 , and since we know which factors 
increase g, the price cost margin increases (ceteris paribus) with i) the utility 
of the to the one side of the participation on the other of the side(s), ii) the 
correlation between the market shares on both sides of the market (S), iii) the 
elasticity of demand, and with the participation on the other side of the 
market. These effects may blur the effect of increase of cross-ownership on 




5 Conclusions  
This article analysed the effects of horizontal cross-ownership on effective 
market concentration in the Finnish newspaper publishing industry. The 
industry has been characterised by a high level of ownership concentration, 
which has increased over the decades. The concerns arising from a 
concentrated market structure to sustain a competitive market were initially 
strengthened by the observation of some substantial horizontal cross-
ownerships. However, our analysis of the effect of these cross-ownerships at 
the regional level and inferences on what they would mean for the average 
industry profitability showed that the effects are small. Considering the 
corrections required due to the nature of two-sided markets do not materially 
alter this conclusion. 
This is to say that the cross-ownerships, when we exclude the effects of 
joint ventures, common owners, or of influence that goes beyond a passive 
shareholding, do not materially alter the level of concerns stemming from the 
concentrated market structure. It seems likely that, despite considering these 
features, as long as the markets for daily newspapers are mainly regional, the 
main concern is the high concentration itself. Nevertheless, high 
concentration has a potential to boost the effect of cross-ownership as to attain 
larger profits. This warrants a critical approach to attempts to increase the 
cross-ownership further. 
Future avenues of this research include alternative assumptions regarding 
the degree of control associated with the shareholdings and incorporating the 
effects of common owners. Finding empirical evidence on the magnitude of 
the correction for two-sidedness would also contribute to a more realistic 
view of effects of the effective rates of market concentration. Audited 
circulation figures of newspapers that we used in calculating the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), have traditionally provided a standardized, 
authoritative statement of a publication's printing, distribution, and 
readership. . However, during the last couple of years, some of the 
newspapers, including the two national tabloids, have stopped auditing their 




If this becomes an increasing trend within the newspaper publishing 
industry20 the measuring of concentration becomes very difficult and 
eventually impossible. Therefore, there is an increasing need to create new 
and reliable ways to measure concentration in the future.
 
 
20 Within the Finnish magazine publishing industry, it is already qite common not to audit 
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